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Security

This page states what zdr.sh keeps, encrypts and destroys, and how to report a problem. It is the
technical detail behind the trust page at /security, and every claim here is carried by
the code or the document this page names. Where a guarantee is a contract rather than a setting, the
page says so.

Zero retention, precisely#

Partner routes are admitted only under a written zero-retention agreement, and a request that
requires that tier fails closed instead of falling back to a route that is not. A key carries the
requirement as the "zero-retention routes only" switch, and a single request can ask for it with the
:zdr suffix on the model id; neither is a header that could be stripped in transit. The rented GPU
routes serve the same models at the same published price and are stated as transient: the platform stores
nothing there either, but the machine's operator holds root and can see a request while it runs, so
it is not zero retention and no zero-retention request reaches it. Zero retention
states both tiers. The gateway keeps no copy of a request or an answer on either tier.

A request leaves a usage line: its id, the account, the key, the model, the token counts, the
latency, the cost, the status and the time. The body of the request and the body of the answer are
not in it. The provider's side of the rule is the agreement, held per provider and available on
request before you rely on it for a regulated workload. Zero retention states
the full rule, including the narrow inspection carve-outs a provider's public terms may reserve.

Encryption#

In transit#

The site and the API answer over encrypted connections only. The edge redirects plain http and sends
a strict transport security policy for two years, with a content security policy that allows scripts
and styles from the site itself and nothing else. Requests to the inference API are encrypted from
the client to the edge and from the edge to the gateway.

At rest#

Backups are encrypted at rest. The secrets the gateway must keep are sealed with authenticated
encryption under a server key: the second factors, the signing secret of a usage webhook and the
provider credentials the catalog holds. The sealed value is what is written; the database never holds
the clear one, and a value sealed under a previous key is re-sealed with the current one as its row is
written again after a rotation.

Passwords are kept only as an argon2id hash, never in clear.

What is not encrypted at rest today#

The text of the memory vault rests in the service database, and the host disk is not encrypted. The
protection there is access control on the host and on the database, not encryption. If you need the
current technical details for a compliance review, ask support before you rely on this page.

Account security#

The people behind an account prove who they are with a second factor and a step-up confirmation before sensitive actions; Account security states the ways in and what the platform never asks for.

API keys#

A key is generated once and shown once. The gateway stores a SHA-256 hash of the key and a short
prefix, so the credential can be named in a support thread without existing in the database. A key
that is lost cannot be recovered, only revoked and replaced.

Revoking a key in the dashboard refuses it on its next request: the key's row and the cache entry
that resolves it are invalidated together. The export of an account's keys carries their names, the
models they may reach, their limits and their routing policy, and never a secret or a hash.

The same principle covers the other credentials: an API key is never written to a log, the edge drops
every request header from its access log, and the gateway's own log keeps the method, the path, the
status, the size, the duration, the request id and the client address.

What is kept, and why#

Three features keep text on purpose, and each is a choice a key makes: the memory vault holds the
notes you write until you delete them, the response cache holds an answer for ten minutes when a key
turns it on, and the idempotency replay holds the answer to a request that carried an
Idempotency-Key for 24 hours so a retry is answered once. Optimizations
states the cache window.

Agent machines#

An agent runs in a virtual machine on a hypervisor the platform controls. The machine's disk is a
LUKS-encrypted overlay whose key lives outside the guest, in the hypervisor's secret store. Disposing
the machine destroys that key, so every copy of the ciphertext becomes unreadable, including a copy
taken before the disposal.

The erasure was proved on the hosting machine on 16 November 2026: a copy of an encrypted disk was
taken aside, the machine was disposed, the key was gone from the secret store, and a probe that tried
to start the copied disk failed with Secret not found: no secret with matching uuid. The machine's
boot measurements were unaffected, because the encryption sits below the guest.

Two limits, and the one caveat for a machine created before this shipped, in the same words the operator's manual uses:

  • A host compromised while the key is present still has it. Crypto-erasure makes deletion
    provable; it does not protect a running machine.
  • A backup that included both the machine's files and the hypervisor's secret store would undo an
    erasure. No such backup exists: the host backup procedure excludes the secret store.
  • A machine created before this shipped keeps a plaintext disk until it is rebuilt. A rebuild mints
    a new key, and the host's definition says which shape a machine is. Ask support which shape your
    machine is.

Closing an account with an agent#

Closing an account queues the disposal of its agent in the same transaction that ends the contract,
and the account's erasure refuses to run while an agent row is not disposed: nothing is deleted
until the machine's disk key has been destroyed, so a deleted account cannot orphan a running
machine. Once the disposal has run, the agent's own data goes with the account, including its name,
its purpose, the SSH keys you gave it, its sealed channel credentials and its run history. What
proves the contract (the ledger and the audit trail) stays, as the retention table in the
privacy policy says.

Test money is separated from revenue#

Sandbox deposits exist so the payment path can be exercised end to end without spending real money on
a real chain. The switch that enables them (billing.sandbox_deposits_open) ships off and is
owner-only; no customer route reads it, and the top-up endpoint cannot create a sandbox row whatever
the switch says.

A sandbox credit is marked in three independent places: a sandbox flag on the payment and on the
chain observation, a virtual receiving address that starts with sandbox: and a transaction id that
spells sandbox in hex. The receipt email and the customer's own payment record carry the flag too, and
the reconciliation that checks the payments excludes sandbox payments: there is no chain output behind one, so counting
it would report a permanent delta.

Report a vulnerability#

Write to the operator's address in the footer of this site and mark the subject as a security
report. There is no separate security mailbox; the same address handles support, data protection and
legal notices.

  • Say what you did, what you expected and what happened. A request id, a dashboard record or a
    timestamp makes the report much easier to follow up.
  • Do not test against another account's data. Acceptable use applies to a
    test as much as to a workload.
  • No response time is published for a security report, and the terms provide the service without
    guaranteed service levels. The privacy policy and the
    terms of service state the two times that are committed in writing: a request about
    your data is answered within one month, and a complaint within 30 days.

What is not claimed#

zdr.sh does not claim SOC 2, ISO 27001 or any other certification, audit badge or third-party
attestation. The platform states what it does and where each guarantee stops, and holds the vendor
agreements and the current technical details for the customers who need them in a review. A page
that claimed a certificate it did not hold would be the first sign that the other claims were
unreliable.

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